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Abstract 
In many countries, collective bargaining coverage is enhanced by government-issued 
extensions that widen the reach of collective agreements beyond their signatory parties 
to all firms and workers in the sector. This paper analyses the causal impact of 
extensions using a natural experiment in Portugal that resulted in a sharp and 
unanticipated decline in the extension probability of agreements. Our results, based on 
a regression discontinuity design, indicate that extensions had a negative impact on 
employment growth. This effect is concentrated amongst non-affiliated firms, which 
may reflect the limited representativeness of employer associations.  
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
Following the global financial crisis and the large increase in unemployment that ensued, 
there has been a renewed interest in the role of collective bargaining for economic 
performance. This interest may increase again during the ongoing pandemic crisis. Well-
functioning collective bargaining systems can promote high and stable employment by 
increasing the responsiveness of working conditions - such as wages and working hours - 
to economic shocks. This is achieved either through effective coordination that allows 
working conditions to be aligned with macro-economic conditions or through 
decentralization which facilitates greater consistency between wages and firm-level 
conditions (Blanchard et al., 2014; Dustmann et al., 2014; OECD, 2018).  
One may also argue that, when fostering wage growth, collective bargaining has the 
potential of promoting consumption and hence aggregate demand. This may be of particular 
relevance where there is economic slack, inflation is low and the room for macroeconomic 
policy stimulus is limited. However, if not functioning optimally, collective bargaining 
systems run the risk of reducing the responsiveness of working conditions to negative 
aggregate shocks. As a result, collective bargaining may increase the social costs of 
economic downturns by increasing the reliance on labor shedding and slowing down labor 
market adjustment.  
In many countries, particularly but not only in Europe, collective bargaining coverage is 
determined to an important extent by extensions issued by governments. These 
administrative extensions widen the reach of collective agreements over and beyond their 
signatory parties - typically firms affiliated with subscribing employer associations and 
workers affiliated with subscribing trade unions - to all firms and workers in the sector 
where the agreement was signed. Extensions have been motivated by the goal of creating a 
level-playing field and, in doing so, limiting the scope of competition on the basis of less 
generous working conditions while enhancing inclusiveness and reducing wage inequality. 
Extensions can also reduce the transaction costs of setting working conditions, which may 
be particularly important for small firms that lack the resources to engage in firm-level 
bargaining and in contexts in which general labour law is limited. 
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A first quantitative indication of the importance of extensions for collective bargaining 
coverage can be obtained by contrasting trade union density - the share of workers affiliated 
to a union - with collective bargaining coverage – the percentage of workers whose working 
conditions are subject to a collective agreement (Figure 1). In countries where the 
difference between union density and bargaining coverage is large, such as France, 
extensions tend to be important.2 Moreover, extensions have allowed collective bargaining 
coverage to remain particularly high in several countries, even when union density has 
declined. 
Figure 1. Collective bargaining coverage and trade union density 
 
Source: ILO (2013) 
Early theoretical work has highlighted potential concerns about the role of extensions for 
employment, particularly when the social partners are unrepresentative of the sector. Moll 
(1996) presents a model of administrative extensions with heterogeneous firms in which 
only some fraction of the largest and most productive firms is engaged in collective 
 
2 However, (administrative) extensions are not the only factor behind the difference. In many countries, 
agreements apply erga omnes to all workers in a firm that co-signs a collective agreement irrespective of their 
union membership status. This extends the coverage of the agreement within the firm. However, this is not 
the case in Portugal, the country examined here, where in the absence of extensions, agreements only apply 
to unionized workers in affiliated firms (the ’double affiliation’ principle). Of course, this does not prevent 
(affiliated) firms from unilaterally offering more generous conditions to non-unionised workers as well, 
which can also reduce the incentives for workers to unionise. 
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bargaining. He shows that these firms benefit from extensions because it reduces 
competition from less productive firms and allows paying lower wages. By contrast, non-
unionized low productivity firms need to pay higher wages, reducing the scope for low-
wage competition. In the same spirit, Haucap et al. (2001) show that employer associations 
can use extensions as an anti-competitive device by raising the labor cost of potential 
entrants. For both reasons, non-representative extensions could reduce employment 
opportunities for low-productivity workers. 
Empirical papers that analyse the role of administrative extensions do not yield a uniform 
picture. Murtin et al. (2014) show, using country-level panel data, that excess coverage –
the difference between bargaining coverage and union density – is not systematically 
correlated with (higher) unemployment.3 Magruder (2012) finds, in the case of South 
Africa, that extensions in industries within specific districts reduce employment by around 
10% compared with uncovered neighbouring districts in the same industry. Martins (2019) 
analyses the effects of extensions in Portugal during the period 2008-2011. Drawing on the 
scattered timing of extensions, social security data, and a difference-in-differences 
approach, he finds that extensions tend to decrease sectoral employment by 2% over the 
four months following an extension, particularly among smaller firms. By contrast, Hartog 
et al. (2002) do not find much of a role for extensions in the Netherlands.4  
Taking these findings at face value, one possible explanation is that the results differ 
because extensions operate differently in different countries. Indeed, the Netherlands 
subjects extension requests to strict criteria to ensure that collective agreements are 
representative of the entire sector (Hijzen et al, 2019), while this is not the case or applies 
only to a more limited extent in most other countries where extensions are important. If 
more representative employer associations negotiate more representative agreements that 
suit most firms in their sector, this could explain the absence of adverse employment effects 
in the Netherlands. Importantly, no previous studies have directly examined the role of 
 
3 However, they also present evidence that suggests that the effects are more adverse in countries where the 
tax wedge – the difference between labor costs and take-home pay for employees - is higher. 
4 See also Martins et al (2017), who also consider the case of Portugal, and Diéz-Catalán and Villanueva 
(2015), who explore the contrast in collective bargaining in Spain before and after the emergence of the 2008 
financial crisis and find evidence of increased job loss from more generous contracts. De Ridder and Euwals 
(2016) provide suggestive evidence that extensions increase wages in the Netherlands, but do not consider 
the role of extensions for employment. 
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representativeness by taking account of the membership of firms to employer associations. 
This paper contributes to the literature on collective bargaining by providing new insights 
on the causal impact of extensions. More specifically, this paper analyses the impact of 
administrative extensions of collective agreements on employment in affiliated versus non-
affiliated firms. Importantly, it sheds light on the extent to which concerns about 
representativeness are warranted in practice. Our paper is also related to a broader literature 
about the role of firms in explaining wage inequality and the contrasting outlooks across 
countries, possibly depending on their evolving collective bargaining models (Card et al., 
2013; Devicienti et al., 2019). 
The analysis is based on a natural experiment that resulted from the immediate suspension 
of extensions by the new government in Portugal that took office in June 2011. We employ 
a regression discontinuity design (RDD) that exploits the standard administrative delay 
between the time an agreement is concluded until the time it is extended in combination 
with the suspension of extensions in June 2011. Importantly, this resulted in a sharp and 
unanticipated decline in the probability that an extension was issued several months prior 
to the change in government and the change in policy regarding extensions. This approach 
offers important advantages over the difference-in-differences method adopted in Martins 
(2019), which also draws on a different data set and covers a different period. 
Our main result is that extensions had a negative effect on employment growth during the 
period 2010-2011, amounting to five percentage points or more depending on the 
specification. Moreover, the negative impact of extensions tends to be concentrated among 
non-affiliated firms. This suggests that the limited representativeness of employer 
associations is a potentially important factor behind the adverse effect of extensions on 
employment. These large effects are likely to reflect to some extent the specific context of 
recession during which the natural experiment took place. The adverse effects of extensions 
are also larger the longer the administrative delay in processing extensions. The latter 
reflects the role of retro-activity, which refers to the requirement in place until the 2012 
labour reform for non-affiliated firms to pay wage arrears over the period from the entry-
into-force of the original collective agreement to the time when the extension is issued. 
Finally, we present evidence that suggests that the adverse effect of extensions on 
employment growth comes about through their impact on wages in the bottom part of the 
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distribution. This hints at a potential trade-off between the wage and employment effects 
of extensions. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the economic and 
institutional context at the time of the experiment. Section 3 describes the experiment, 
explains how this is exploited using a regression discontinuity design and discusses the 
validity of this approach in the present context. Section 4 discusses our matched employer-
employee dataset complemented with information on collective agreements and extensions 
(including their timings). Section 5 presents the evidence on the impact of administrative 
extensions across the board as well as separately for firms that are affiliated to an employer 
association and those that are not. It also analyses how the impact of extensions depends 
on the degree of representativeness of employer associations and the role of retro-activity 
in combination with the administrative delay in processing extensions. Section 6 presents 
some additional results in relation to wage inequality. Finally, Section 7 concludes. 
II.   ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 
During the 2000s, Portugal experienced low growth, declining international 
competitiveness and deepening macroeconomic imbalances (Blanchard, 2007). As a result, 
the country had to face up to the global financial crisis in an already fragile situation. The 
global financial crisis prompted large increases in public deficits and loss of market access 
amid a sudden stop in capital flows, leading to a request for financial assistance, in April 
2011, directed towards the European Union, the European Central Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund. Financial support was made available, conditional on several 
structural reforms and adjustment measures. Given the potential importance of real wage 
adjustment to minimize employment losses and concerns about the role of collective 
bargaining, structural reforms also included measures on the extension of collective 
agreement to non-affiliated firms.  
Until mid-2011, collective bargaining in Portugal – as in many other European countries – 
took place almost exclusively at the sectoral level, being driven by negotiations between 
employer associations and trade unions. Firm-level bargaining was essentially limited to 
state-owned and former state-owned companies and a small number of other very large 
firms or holdings. Moreover, coverage of (sectoral) collective agreements was very high, 
despite the low union and employer association density rate (estimated at 11% and 25% in 
2009 of workers and firms, respectively), due to administrative extensions which widened 
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the reach of collective agreements beyond the signatory parties to all firms and workers in 
each sector.5  
For an extension of a collective agreement to be issued a request needed to be made to the 
government by either the subscribing employer association or the trade union (or both), 
with respect to a new or a revised collective agreement (both of which were typically about 
the updating of the minimum wages for workers of different occupations and job levels – 
Martins (2019)). The government would then assess the economic and social desirability 
of a potential extension, partly based on an empirical analysis of the number of workers 
potentially affected (in terms of increased salaries), while allowing other firms or unions to 
present arguments against the potential extension. While this administrative procedure 
would delay the issuance of extensions by several months, the positive outcome of this 
procedure was virtually never in doubt, resulting in the extension of almost all collective 
agreements. To fully promote a level-playing field, extensions entered into force retro-
actively, so that they would have legal effect at the same time as the underlying collective 
agreements for the signatory parties, even if the extensions were issued (much) later. This 
forced firms to pay wage increases to workers not initially covered in the collective 
agreements, i.e. workers employed by non-affiliated firms and non-unionised workers in 
affiliated firms (the latter if their firms had not already extended internally and unilaterally 
the collective agreement). These wage increases had to be paid not only from the time the 
extension was issued but also from the time the underpinning agreement was signed.  
Due to the low levels of membership of the social partners (in particular the unions), 
extensions played a key role in supporting high and stable collective bargaining coverage 
in Portugal and effectively removed the scope for low-wage competition between affiliated 
and non-affiliated firms in each sector. Given the high level of unemployment and the need 
for restoring international competitiveness, extensions were increasingly seen as a source 
of downward wage rigidity, particularly in smaller, younger, and typically less productive 
firms, who were generally not affiliated and not represented in the collective bargaining 
process. The low affiliation rates of the social partners thus not only increased the economic 
 
5 In the absence of extensions, the “double affiliation principle” applies. See footnote 2 for details. 
Collective agreements and their revisions were also focused on the increase of the minimum wages per 
occupation, as most non-wage provisions simply replicated the contents of the Labour Code (Martins and 
Saraiva, 2020). 
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importance of coverage extensions, but also raised concerns that collectively agreed wage 
floors did not reflect appropriate working conditions for non-affiliated firms.  
To address questions about the role of administrative extensions for wage adjustment, the 
government that took office in June 2011 temporarily suspended the issuance of extensions 
with immediate effect while preparing a reform about the procedures governing extensions. 
This decision was made in the context of the structural reform package agreed between 
Portugal and the ‘troika’ (EU, ECB and IMF). This package included a provision about 
collective bargaining (“define clear criteria to be followed for the extension of collective 
agreements”, including “the representativeness of the negotiating organisations and the 
implications of the extension for the competitive position of non-affiliated firms”).6 The 
ensuing labor law reform of 2012 re-introduced extension procedures, while revising them 
in two important ways. The first was to subject extensions to representativeness criteria. 
This entailed that extensions were made conditional on the employer association 
representing firms that together accounted for 50% of the workforce of the relevant sector. 
The second change was that extensions entered into force at the date of the administrative 
decision on the extension rather than the entry-into-force date of the collective agreement 
itself—in other words, retroactivity was abandoned.  
Given the low density of employer association membership, this led to concerns that the 
50% representativeness criteria were too strict. Figure 2 documents the degree of 
representativeness of sectoral collective agreements signed between September 2010 and 
August 2011. Representativity is measured by share of the workforce in firms that are 
affiliated to an employer association with respect to the total workforce of the sector. The 
figure shows that, in most collective agreements, such share in affiliated firms fell well 
short of the 50% threshold adopted.   
 
 
6 The full passage reads “Define clear criteria to be followed for the extension of collective agreements and 
commit to them. The representativeness of the negotiating organisations and the implications of the extension 
for the competitive position of nonaffiliated firms will have to be among these criteria. The representativeness 
of negotiating organisations will be assessed on the basis of both quantitative and qualitative indicators. To 
that purpose, the Government will charge the national statistical authority to do a survey to collect data on 
the representativeness of social partners on both sides of industry. Draft legislation defining criteria for 
extension and modalities for their implementation will be prepared by Q2-2012”. See the full text of the 
memorandum in http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/eu_borrower/mou/2011-05-18-mou-portugal_en.pdf 
(page 24). 
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Figure 2. The representativeness of collective agreements 
Number of sectoral collective agreements signed between September 2010 and August 2011by 
the share of workers in firms affiliated to an employer association  
 
Source: Ministry of Labour (DGERT) and Quadros de Pessoal, authors’ calculations. Note: The 
vertical axis indicates the number of agreements of each level of representativeness 
 
Consequently, the re-introduction of extensions in 2012 only led to a modest pick-up in the 
number of administrative extensions as shown in Figure 3. This largely reflected the 
persistently low number of new or revised collective agreements concluded at the sectoral 
level.7 
Lingering concerns about the stringency of representativeness criteria in relation to 
extensions resulted in another reform in extension criteria in July 2014, after the end of the 
adjustment program, which introduced an alternative representativeness criterion, met if 
more than 30% of firms affiliated to a signatory employer association consisted of small or 
medium-sized enterprises (firms employing less than 250 employees). Since this is likely 
 
7 Apart from between 2011 and 2012, the figure also reveals a sharp but temporary decline in the number 
agreements signed and extended in 2004. This reflects the role of the 2003 labour reform that delayed the 
conclusion of new or revised agreements until the reform was completed. This change therefore does not 
reflect an unanticipated change in the extension regime as was the case in the period under study in this paper 
and is therefore not amenable to the same evaluation as the one conducted in the present paper.    
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to be the case for the large majority of employer associations, this largely represented a 
return to the situation pre-2011. This has resulted in a modest pick-up of the number of 
extensions issued in 2015 (Figure 3). More recently, in June 2017, representativeness 
criteria were dropped altogether, making extensions virtually automatic again, even in the 
current context of the Covid19 pandemic and its very negative labour market effects. 
 
Figure 3. Number of sectoral collective agreements and extensions, 2000-2015 
 
Source: Ministry of Labour (DGERT), authors’ calculations. Note: The vertical axis 
indicates the number of agreements in each year considered. 
 
 
III.   METHODOLOGY 
A.   The “natural” experiment 
In order to analyse the causal effects of coverage extensions, this paper makes use of the 
natural experiment that resulted from the decision of the government that took office in 
2011 to immediately suspend the extension of collective agreements, as described above. 
Importantly, due to the usual administrative delay associated with the extension of 
collective agreements, a substantial number of collective agreements had been signed 
before the new government took office, on 21 June 2011, but were not extended or, in a 
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limited number of cases, had their extension considerably delayed (to the second  half of 
2012 or later).   
As shown in Figure 4, this created a sharp discontinuity around February/March 2011 in 
the probability that a collective agreement was extended in the 12 months following the 
conclusion of a collective agreement. More specifically, the figure displays the probability 
that collective agreements published in each of the weeks before or after 1 March 2011 are 
extended in 2011. Until 24 January 2011, about five weeks before the cutoff date, all 
collective agreements were extended during the subsequent twelve months. In the period 
from 24 January 2011 to 28 February 2011 some collective agreements were extended, but 
not all as was the case before, presumably because no decision had been reached by the 
time the new government took office. From 1 March 2011 until 20 June 2011, no collective 
agreements were extended during the subsequent twelve months. 
Figure 4. The probability that a collective agreement is extended 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Labour (DGERT), authors’ calculations. Weeks from 1 March 2011 
(September 2010 – June 2011) 
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Moreover, the decision of the new government to suspend the extension of collective 
agreements was unexpected and hence could not be anticipated by trade unions and 
employer associations conducting the collective bargaining (a process that can last six 
months or more). In fact, in February or even in March 2011, there was no public 
information regarding the April 6th bailout request, the May 17th bailout package, the June 
5th elections (unexpected as a full legislature would come to an end only in 2013) nor the 
new policy on extensions introduced by the government that took office in June 21st.  
This means that insofar as one focuses on a short window around 1 March 2011, it is 
unlikely that there are systematic differences in the characteristics of workers and firms 
covered by collective agreements in the period just before the new government took office 
- and that were extended - and the characteristics of workers and firms covered by collective 
agreements in the period just after the new government took office - and that were not 
extended. While this is uncontroversial in Portugal, it is important for the present paper as 
it determines the validity of the “natural” experiment for analyzing the causal impact of 
extensions.   
B.   Regression discontinuity design 
The sharp and unanticipated decline in the probability that a collective agreement is 
extended in early 2011 is used to analyse the impact of extensions by means of a regression 
discontinuity design (RDD). The intuition of RDD is that the outcomes of firms and 
workers covered by collective agreements signed just before 1 March 2011 provide a good 
counterfactual for those of firms and workers where a collective agreement had been signed 
just after 1 March but was not extended. The main advantage of RDD compared with other 
quasi-experimental estimators is that it relies on relatively weak assumptions and that these 
are testable in the same way as in a randomised experiment (Hahn et al., 2001; Lee and 
Lemieux, 2010).  
 
Since there is some variation in the administrative delay associated with the extension of 
agreements, the probability of extension does not fall from one to zero from one week to 
the next (see Figure 4). In order to use a strict sharp design, we drop the two agreements 
signed between 24 January and 28 February of 2011 that were not extended. In this case, 
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all agreements signed before 1 March 2011 were extended and all those signed after were 
not.8  
 
Formally, the sharp RDD can be described by the following model:  
 
(1) 𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝐷𝑖 + 𝛾𝑓(𝑡𝑖 − 𝑇) + 𝜃𝑋𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖, 
 
where yi refers to the outcome variable of interest, e.g. the growth rate of employment 
between 2010 and 2011 across all firms subject to collective agreement i, Di is a treatment 
dummy that is equal to one if an agreement i is extended in 2011 and zero otherwise (in 
practice, this means that the dummy takes value zero from 1 March 2011 onwards), 𝑓(. ) is 
a function that controls for the independent effect of relative time t on both sides of the 
threshold T (i.e. the number of weeks until or since the time threshold), and Xi is a set of 
controls (discussed in Section C below).9  
 
An alternative possibility is to make use of a fuzzy RDD that explicitly takes account of 
the non-fully sharp decline in the probability of extension during the period 24 January 
2011 to 28 February 2011, given the two data points mentioned above. Formally, the fuzzy 
RDD can be described by an outcome equation and a treatment equation. The treatment 
equation models the probability that a collective agreement is extended conditional on 
relative time  as a function of a constant (𝛼), a dummy (Ti) that is equal to one from the 
date after which the probability of an extension is zero and a function that controls for the 
independent effect of relative time on both sides of the threshold (𝑓(. )): 
 
(2a) 𝐷𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝑇𝑖 + 𝛾𝑓(𝑡𝑖 − 𝑇) + 𝜃𝑋𝑖 + 𝑖 
 
 
8 An alternative option would be to focus on agreements signed just before 24 January 2011 and those signed 
just after 28 February 2011. However, this would unduly restrict the size of the sample.  
9 In other words, in our RDD we make use of a cross-sectional comparison of annual outcomes within the 
same year between firms in sectors covered by collective agreements that were extended and firms in 
sectors covered by collective agreements that were not extended. Therefore, we do not conduct an RDD 
over time: our outcome variables focus on changes between October of one year (say 2011) and October of 
the previous year (2010).  
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The outcome equation in turn models the outcome variable of interest (y) as a function of 
a constant (𝛼), the predicted probability that the agreement is extended ?̂? and a function 
that controls for the independent effect of time on both sides of the threshold (𝑓(. )), as in 
(2a): 
 
(2b) 𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝜏?̂?𝑖 + 𝛾𝑓(𝑡𝑖 − 𝑇) + 𝜃𝑋𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖 
 
The outcome and treatment equations are estimated with 2SLS using the same estimation 
sample for the treatment and outcome equations. 
 
In practice, we pool the data (described below) across affiliated and non-affiliated firms, 
that is, we stack them up for each collective agreement. We then perform two exercises. 
First, we estimate the impact of extensions on total employment growth between October 
2010 and October 2011 across firms while controlling for affiliation status. Second, in order 
to analyze the differential effects of extensions on firms that are affiliated to an employer 
association versus those that are not, we add an interaction between the treatment dummy 
and the dummy for affiliation status, while also allowing for different relative time effects 
across affiliation-status groups, and, as before, controlling for the independent effect of 
affiliation status. Standard errors correct for heteroskedasticity and are clustered by 
agreement date and agreement to take account of the discrete nature of our data as suggested 
by Card and Lee (2008) as well as the fact that we split and then pool the data between 
affiliated and non-affiliated firms. Note that we draw on a limited number of agreements 
and that it would be desirable to have a larger sample size, particularly around the cutoff. 
 
Controlling for relative time effects is key in the present context for two main reasons. First, 
since the dependent variables are measured in October 2010 and October 2011, the part of 
the year to which firms are exposed to extensions depends on the timing of the extensions. 
An agreement that is extended later necessarily has a smaller time period to generate effects 
than one that is extended earlier. Second, economic conditions may affect the timing of 
agreements as well as their actual contents. For these reasons, outcomes are likely to depend 
on relative time. In our analysis, relative time effects are assumed to be either linear or 
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quadratic and are allowed to differ between the two sides of the threshold.10 Regressions 
are weighted (by the number of employees in 2010) in order to obtain the average effect of 
extensions on total employment (rather than the average effect of extensions across 
collective agreements). 
An important feature of RDD is that, as long as the treatment is randomized around the 
threshold, controlling for any characteristics should not affect the estimated size of the 
discontinuity at the threshold. Controlling for observed or unobserved characteristics in our 
context may nevertheless be helpful, to take account of the potential effects of any other 
differences across sectors that concluded their bargaining just before or after the threshold 
for extension.  
 
C.   Validity 
The validity of our natural experiment hinges on the assumption that the decision of the 
new government to suspend the extension of collective agreements was unexpected and 
hence could not be anticipated by the social partners. If, on the contrary, the suspension of 
extensions had been anticipated, this could have affected the incentives for concluding an 
agreement and hence the frequency of observing new or revised collective agreements. 
Figure 5 plots the number of agreements in each week during the period September 2010 
to June 2011. It does not indicate that the average number of collective agreements 
published in each week declined after 1 March 2011. The average number of agreements 
per week is even slightly higher after 1 March 2011 than in the period that preceded it.11  
 
Figure 5. The number of collective agreements over time 
 
Weeks from 1 March 2011 (September 2010 – June 2011) 
 
10 Given the small number of collective agreements, we will mainly focus on (potentially asymmetric) 
linear relative time effects.  
11 Given the limited number of collective agreements in each week, a formal test on the continuity of the 
density of agreements around the threshold would not be informative.  
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Source: Ministry of Labour (DGERT), author’s calculations. 
Anticipation effects may also be reflected in the contents of the agreements and their 
composition across different types of firms and workers. In order to check whether there 
are any systematic differences between agreements signed just before and after 1 March 
2011, we conducted a series of balancing tests which assess whether there are 
discontinuities along a variety of different dimensions across the threshold (Table 1). In 
practical terms, this involves estimating equations (1) and (2) using several pre-determined 
variables in our dataset as the dependent variable (see the next section for more information 
on our data). These are respectively the degree of representativeness (the share of the sector 
workforce in affiliated firms), pre-reform employment growth (2009-2010), the size of the 
agreement in terms of the log number of employees potentially covered, log average firm 
size (in terms of employment), log average hourly wage, log median hourly wage, export 
intensity (exports as share of total revenue), and log labor productivity (revenue per 
worker). The balancing tests control for linear or quadratic relative time effects and are 
conducted for the pooled sample as well as separately by affiliation status.  
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Table 1. Balancing tests 
 
Notes: The estimates reported correspond to the coefficients of the extension dummy in equation (1). 
Regressions are weighted by the number of employees in 2010. Standard errors are robust and clustered by 
collective agreement and signature date. *, **, *** refer to statistical significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. 
 
The results in Table 1 suggest that for some variables there are statistically significant 
differences between the treatment and control groups. Given the relatively small number 
of agreements used in the present context and the large number of variables considered in 
these balancing tests, this should not be surprising.  It suggests, however, that the natural 
experiment that we are exploiting does not provide the full equivalent of a randomized 
experiment. To address this, we make the treatment and control groups more comparable 
by explicitly allowing for differential pre-treatment trends in employment (in practical 
terms this is done by transforming the dependent variable into the change in the growth 
rate) as well as by including all variables as controls for which systematic differences are 
observed in our balancing analysis (average firm size and average export intensity).  
 
IV.   DATA AND IMPLEMENTATION  
A.    Administrative personnel records (Quadros de Pessoal) 
The main data for this paper are Personnel Records (Quadros de Pessoal, henceforth QP), 
an administrative matched employer-employee panel that covers the universe of firms and 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (3) (4)
Balancing variables linear quadratic linear quadratic linear quadratic
Representativeness, 2010 0.0815 -0.0080 0.0923 -0.0183 0.0220 0.0303
 - share of workforce in afffiliated firms (0.1143) (0.0574) (0.1422) (0.0617) (0.0695) (0.0510)
Employment growth, 2009-2010 0.0865 0.0975 0.0953 0.1045 0.0813 0.0844
(0.0155) (0.0080) (0.0195) (0.0106) (0.0099) (0.0076)
*** *** *** *** *** ***
Log employment, 2010 -0.2195 -0.1584 -0.4327 -0.3626 0.5093 0.1547
(0.6026) (0.6073) (0.6009) (0.6273) (0.7890) (0.5082)
Log average firm size, 2010 -1.2418 -1.4115 -1.2439 -1.3098 -1.5805 -1.6135
 - number of workers per firm (0.3004) (0.1840) (0.2429) (0.2017) (0.2265) (0.1765)
*** *** *** *** *** ***
Log average wage, 2010 -0.0510 -0.0812 -0.0530 -0.0603 -0.1147 -0.1120
 - within job title and year (0.0870) (0.0956) (0.0852) (0.0875) (0.0901) (0.0758)
Log median wage, 2010 0.0040 -0.0092 -0.0127 -0.0059 -0.0243 -0.0035
 - within job title and year (0.0764) (0.0828) (0.0775) (0.0781) (0.0824) (0.0605)
Export intensity, 2010 -0.4642 -0.4553 -0.4072 -0.3808 -0.5818 -0.6151
(0.0523) (0.0494) (0.0579) (0.0583) (0.0466) (0.0264)
*** *** *** *** *** ***
Log labour productivity, 2010 0.1753 -0.0735 0.2313 0.0320 -0.2217 -0.1636
(0.4604) (0.5252) (0.4727) (0.5360) (0.3814) (0.2627)
All Non-affiliated Affiliated
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workers in the private sector in Portugal (see Cardoso and Portugal, 2005, and Martins et 
al, 2012, for earlier papers using QP). Given our goals, we make use of annual information 
for the period 2009-2011. The information on workers (e.g. employment, earnings) refers 
to October of each year, while that on firms (e.g. sales) refers to the full year. Particularly 
important for the present purposes is the information on the applicable collective agreement 
for each worker and on employer association membership of firms, i.e. whether they are a 
member and, if so, of which association (see Addison et al (2017) and Martins (2020) for 
analyses of trade unions and employers’ associations in Portugal). Since the latter is 
available only for 2010, we analyse the role of affiliation status for the impact of extensions 
based on their affiliation in the year before the reform. This implies that we focus on firms 
that were present in 2010, as well as all their workers, but do not consider new firms. For 
the present purposes, we do not require any information on employer association 
membership in the subsequent years. Firms that are covered by firm- and holding-level 
collective agreements are excluded from the analysis. 
B.   Information on collective agreements and extensions (DGERT) 
Information on collective agreements and their possible extensions is publicly available 
from the Ministry of Labour (DGERT) website.12 The resulting dataset includes 
information on the publication dates of collective agreements and, if applicable, of their 
extensions, the signatory employer associations and trade unions as well as the economic 
activities (and regions and or occupations, if applicable) covered by the agreement (see the 
appendix for more detail on the timelines of publications and extensions).  
The dataset used for the empirical analysis consists of 36 collective agreements signed over 
the period October 2010 to August 2011 (see the Annex for details). Together these account 
for approximately 20% of the workforce in the private sector.  In the empirical analysis, we 
mainly focus on the 31 agreements that were signed between 8 October 2010 and 20 June 
2011. The reason for limiting the scope to agreements signed before 20 June 2011 is that 
the extension procedure was suspended when the new government took office in 21 June 
2011. While this decision was not publicized and is unlikely to have had a major impact on 
 
12 http://bte.gep.msess.gov.pt/  
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collective bargaining in the following weeks, we feel it is more prudent to limit ourselves 
to agreements that were signed before the new government took place.13  
The period from 8 October 2010 and 20 June 2011 can be divided into three sub-periods. 
First, a 25-week period from September 2010 to 24 January 2011 during which all nine 
new or revised agreements were subsequently extended. Second, a 5-week transition period 
during which three agreements were signed and two were not (24 January 2011 – 28 
February 2011). Third, a 15-week period from 1 March 2011 to 20 June 2011 during which 
18 new or revised agreements were signed that were not extended during the subsequent 
12 months.  
C. Combining the information into a semi-aggregated dataset 
For the present purposes, we construct a dataset with information on employment and 
wages (as well as sales, exports and productivity) by agreement, year, and membership 
status. This data set follows from combining information from the QP matched employer-
employee panel with information from collective agreements from the Ministry of Labour 
(DGERT). Unfortunately, linking the two sources of information is not straightforward in 
practice since the agreement codes in QP do not necessarily correspond to those used by 
DGERT. We proceeded as follows. First, since workers in each firm may be covered by 
more than one agreement, we focus on the agreement that represents the largest share of 
workers in the firm. Second, we use the name of the employer associations to which 
affiliated firms are affiliated to link collective agreements in QP and DGERT.  Third, we 
extend the linking between the two collective agreement codes (QP and DGERT) to non-
affiliated firms. In other words, we establish the domain of each collective agreement in 
terms of firm identifiers, first using 2010 data (for which we have employer affiliation 
information) and then the remaining years too. Fourth, we collapse the firm-level data by 
year, agreement and employer association membership status. This yields a dataset with 62 
observations (31 agreements for each affiliation status group) for each year.  
In an extension, we also create a different version of our data set, for analysis not at the 
collective-agreement and affiliation-status level but instead at the more detailed 
 
13 However, as will be shown below, the analysis is robust to adding these agreements to the analysis. Note 
also that two agreements had unclear information regarding affiliation membership and are dropped in some 
analysis. 
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occupation/agreement/affiliation level. In this second case, each observation corresponds 
to the number of workers in an occupation of an agreement in (October) of a year. The 
advantage of this approach is that the same occupation can be present in different 
agreements, including agreements that were subject to extensions and agreements that were 
not subject to extensions. However, since there is a change in the occupational classification 
codes between 2009 and 2010, the occupation-level analysis can be conducted for 
employment growth (between 2011 and 2010) but not for the change in employment growth 
(which would also require data for 2009).    
 
V.   RESULTS ON EMPLOYMENT GROWTH 
A.   Overall effects of extensions  
The results on the impact of extensions on employment growth (ΔE2011) and the change in 
employment growth (ΔE2011-ΔE2010) on all covered firms, irrespective of membership 
status, are reported in Table 2. It shows the results based on both the fuzzy and the sharp 
RDD under the assumption of either linear or quadratic relative time effects. The results 
based on the sharp RDD using a linear specification are visualized in Figure 6.14  
According to the results, extensions have an adverse and statistically significant impact on 
employment growth. The results tend to be qualitatively similar whether a fuzzy or a sharp 
set-up is used, whether linear or quadratic controls for relative time are included and 
whether the pre-reform trend is controlled for or not.15 The impact of extensions on 
employment growth is potentially large, ranging from 5 to 10 percentage points depending 
on the specification. These large effects are likely to reflect at least in part the specific 
context during which the natural experiment took place, namely that of the 2011-2013 
recession hitting firms still recovering from the global financial crisis. Because the need for 
adjusting working conditions was presumably greater under such circumstances, extensions 
may have had a larger adverse impact on employment than they would have had in normal 
 
14 For ease of presentation, the results presented in Figure 6 do not include any controls apart from 
affiliation status and relative time effects.   
15 Note, however, that the coefficients lose statistical significance when controlling for quadratic relative 
time effects and focusing on employment growth but remain largely unchanged when focusing on the 
change in employment growth.  
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times. Furthermore, as discussed above, the retro-active entry-into-force of extensions in a 
context where many firms are liquidity constrained is found to have exacerbated the 
negative employment effects found here. 
Table 2. The effects of extensions, all firms 
Panel A. Employment growth, p.p., (ΔE2011)
 
Panel B. Change in employment growth, p.p., (ΔE2011- ΔE2010) 
 
 
Notes: Regressions are weighted by the number of employees in 2010. They include controls for log average 
firm size, export intensity and affiliation status. Standard errors are robust and clustered by collective 
agreement and signature date. *, **, *** refer to statistical significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. Authors’ calculations based on QP and DGERT data.  
 
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Treatment dummy -0.0953 -0.0500 -0.0578 -0.0420
(0.0446) (0.0591) (0.0262) (0.0262)
** **
Constant -0.1042 -0.1358 -0.1226 -0.1293
(0.0388) (0.0274) (0.0313) (0.0236)
** *** *** ***
Relative time effects Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic
Observations 62 62 58 58
R-squared 0.3976 0.4037 0.4290 0.4359
Fuzzy Sharp
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Treatment dummy -0.1574 -0.1472 -0.1022 -0.1035
(0.0548) (0.0709) (0.0301) (0.0295)
*** ** *** ***
Constant -0.1950 -0.1985 -0.2238 -0.1926
(0.0380) (0.0360) (0.0279) (0.0247)
*** *** *** ***
Relative time effects Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic
Observations 62 62 58 58
R-squared 0.6579 0.6581 0.6809 0.6958
Fuzzy Sharp
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Figure 6. The overall effects of extensions on employment growth 
 
Change in employment growth, p.p., (ΔE2011- ΔE2010), sharp RDD 
  
Notes: The figure presents the estimated change in the growth rate of employment by collective agreement 
publication week, as measured from the threshold date of 1 March 2011 (week 0). The results are estimated 
from a sharp RDD using employment weights. The size of the circles is proportional to the employment of 
the corresponding collective agreement(s). Standard errors are robust and clustered by collective agreement 
and signature date. *, **, *** refer to statistical significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Authors’ 
calculations based on QP and DGERT data.  
The results are robust to a variety of different specifications (Table 3). Focusing on the 
specification with linear relative time effects, we now compare the baseline results based 
on the fuzzy RDD and the sharp RDD with alternative specifications or samples (Panel A 
and Panel B), in the following order. “Controls” includes only affiliation status as control 
and not average firm size and export intensity as in the baseline specification. “Bandwidth” 
extends the observation window by including agreements signed after the new government 
took office in June 2011 to the end of August 2011. “Falsification” assesses whether there 
is a discontinuity when using a placebo date that evenly splits the number of agreements in 
the post-reform period (March – August) on each side of a fictional threshold (around the 
middle of May). The results indicate that excluding the controls and extending the 
bandwidth does not qualitatively change the results relative to the baseline. The falsification 
test does not point to any discontinuities in employment growth around the fictional reform 
date.  
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Table 3. Sensitivity analysis, all firms 
Panel A. Fuzzy RDD1 
 
Panel B. Sharp RDD1 
 
 
Panel C. Occupation-level analysis (employment growth)2 
 
Regressions are weighted by the number of employees in 2010 and include controls for log average firm size, 
export intensity and affiliation status unless stated otherwise. *, **, *** refer to statistical significance levels 
of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. “Controls”: affiliation status only; “bandwidth”: October 2010-August 
2011; “Falsification”: placebo reform date (mid-May 2011) using agreements in post-reform period only 
(March 2011 – August 2011).   
1. Standard errors are robust and clustered by collective agreement and signature date.  
2. Standard errors are robust and clustered by collective agreement, occupation and signature date.  
Authors’ calculations based on QP and DGERT data.  
The results are also qualitatively and quantitatively similar when conducting the analysis 
at the occupation/agreement/affiliation level (Panel C). The specification is similar to the 
one for the baseline results except for the inclusion of occupation dummies. Standard errors 
Baseline Controls Bandwidth Falsification Baseline Controls Bandwidth Falsification
Treatment dummy -0.0953 -0.0511 -0.0976 -0.0345 -0.1574 -0.1217 -0.1540 -0.0345
(0.0446) (0.0163) (0.0566) (0.0556) (0.0548) (0.0189) (0.0523) (0.0556)
** *** * *** *** ***
Constant -0.1042 -0.0963 -0.1078 -0.2129 -0.1950 -0.1350 -0.1701 -0.2129
(0.0388) (0.0053) (0.0523) (0.0541) (0.0380) (0.0123) (0.0327) (0.0541)
** *** ** *** *** *** *** ***
Relative time effects Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear
Observations 62 62 76 46 62 62 76 46
R-squared 0.3976 0.3472 0.4975 0.5902 0.6579 0.5452 0.6898 0.5902
Employment growth Change in employment growth
Baseline Controls Bandwidth Falsification Baseline Controls Bandwidth Falsification
Treatment dummy -0.0578 -0.0603 -0.0164 -0.0345 -0.1022 -0.1169 -0.0898 -0.0345
(0.0262) (0.0203) (0.0264) (0.0556) (0.0301) (0.0245) (0.0210) (0.0556)
** *** *** *** ***
Constant -0.1226 -0.0891 -0.1570 -0.2129 -0.2238 -0.1352 -0.2017 -0.2129
(0.0313) (0.0115) (0.0412) (0.0541) (0.0279) (0.0143) (0.0259) (0.0541)
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Relative time effects Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear
Observations 58 58 72 46 58 58 72 46
R-squared 0.4290 0.3917 0.5210 0.5902 0.6809 0.5650 0.7015 0.5902
Employment growth Change in employment growth
Baseline Controls Bandwidth Falsification Baseline Controls Bandwidth Falsification
Treatment dummy -0.1282 -0.0543 -0.1292 -0.0197 -0.0558 -0.0606 -0.0462 -0.0197
(0.0597) (0.0209) (0.0454) (0.0404) (0.0282) (0.0304) (0.0213) (0.0404)
** *** *** ** ** **
Constant 1.5142 -0.0956 -0.2796 -0.6206 1.4891 -0.0897 -0.2920 -0.6206
(1.8044) (0.0150) (0.3563) (0.0827) (1.8096) (0.0265) (0.3562) (0.0827)
*** *** *** ***
Relative time effects Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear
Observations 3,320 3,320 4,257 2,451 3,048 3,048 3,985 2,451
R-squared 0.0774 0.0205 0.1527 0.1626 0.0821 0.0243 0.1646 0.1626
Fuzzy RDD, Employment growth Sharp RDD, Employment growth
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are clusters by occupation, agreement and signature date. The inclusion of occupation 
dummies ensures that the effect of extensions is identified within similar occupations and 
hence not driven by differences in the occupational structure of agreements that extended 
and those that are not extended.  
B.    Effects of extensions by affiliation status 
In order to analyze the effects of extensions across firms that are or are not affiliated to an 
employer association, we now allow their effects to differ across firms that are and those 
that are not by adding an interaction term of the treatment dummy with affiliation status. In 
this case, we consider a new version of our original specification as follows: 
(1) 𝑦𝑖 = α + δ1𝐷𝑖 ∗ 𝐴𝑖 + δ2[𝐷𝑖 ∗ (1 − 𝐴𝑖)] + δ3𝐴𝑖 + γ𝑓(𝑡𝑖 − 𝑇) + θ𝑋𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖, 
 
in which Ai is a dummy variable equal to one for affiliated firms (a status that is already 
determined at the time of the extensions reform). See also Becker et al. (2013) for an 
analysis of the identification of heterogeneous treatment effects with an RDD where the 
heterogeneity of treatment effects pertains to interactions with observable variables as in 
our case. The baseline results along with a number of sensitivity checks are reported in 
Table 4. The results based on sharp RDD with linear relative time effects are visualized in 
Figure 7. 
The results indicate that the adverse impact of extensions on employment growth tends to 
be concentrated among non-affiliated firms. This is the case for the majority of 
specifications reported, including for our preferred specifications that control for the pre-
reform growth rate in employment. The fuzzy RDD results suggest that the impact of 
extensions is negative and statistically significant for non-affiliated firms, but positive and 
statistically significant for affiliated firms. Using the sharp RDD, the results are more 
mixed, with the results for employment growth suggesting that the effects are concentrated 
among affiliated firms and those for the change in employment growth that the effects are 
concentrated among non-affiliated firms.16 Since we prefer the results that control for 
 
16 When focusing on the change in employment growth, extensions have a significant impact on both non-
affiliated firms and affiliated firms, with their impact being about twice as large among non-affiliated firms 
as among affiliated firms. The effects among affiliated firms may indicate that some of these firms only 
increase the pay of their non-unionised workers once extensions are issued. Alternatively, these effects may 
(continued…) 
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differences in the pre-reform growth rate in employment by focusing on the change in 
employment growth, we conclude that the negative effects of extensions are concentrated 
among non-affiliated firms.  
The sensitivity checks further suggest that the baseline results do not hinge on the inclusion 
of controls or the definition of the observation window and systematic differences across 
extended and non-extended agreements in occupational structure. Moreover, the 
falsification test does not point at the presence of any significant discontinuities around the 
fictive threshold in the post-reform period. 
Figure 7. The effects of extensions by affiliation status 
Change in employment growth, p.p., (ΔE2011- ΔE2010)  
 
Notes: “Membership status: 0” refers to non-affiliated firms; “Membership status: 1” refers to affiliated firms. 
The figure presents the estimated change in the growth rate of employment by collective agreement 
publication week, as measured from the threshold date of 1 March 2011 (week 0). The results are estimated 
from a sharp RDD using employment weights. The size of the circles is proportional to the employment of 
the corresponding collective agreement(s). Standard errors are robust and clustered by collective agreement 
and signature date. *, **, *** refer to statistical significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
These results are consistent with the view that affiliated firms can shape the use of 
extensions for their own benefit at the expense of non-affiliated outsiders. They also 
 
reflect the increase in market power by affiliated firms and the subsequent reduction in output and 
employment to maximize profits.  
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provide a first indication that representativeness matters since the wage floors negotiated 
in collective agreements appear to be less appropriate for affiliated firms than for non-
affiliated firms. This suggests that the lack of representativeness of employer associations 
is a potentially important factor behind the adverse effect of extensions. 
Table 4. Results by affiliation status 
Panel A. Employment growth (2010-2011)1 
 
Panel B. Change in employment growth1
 
 
 
 
Baseline Controls Bandwidth Falsification Baseline Controls Bandwidth Falsification
Non-affiliated firms -0.1121 -0.1395 -0.1114 0.0224 -0.0536 -0.0515 -0.0071 0.0684
 * treatment dummy (0.0470) (0.0574) (0.0592) (0.0661) (0.0329) (0.0248) (0.0311) (0.1080)
** ** * **
Affiliated firms 0.1790 0.1172 0.0087 0.0631 -0.0980 -0.0982 -0.0610 -0.0280
* treatment dummy (0.0712) (0.0876) (0.0962) (0.0577) (0.0204) (0.0326) (0.0292) (0.0336)
** *** *** **
Affiliated firms -0.0989 -0.0549 -0.0200 0.0631 -0.1633 -0.0575 -0.0985 -0.0295
(0.0497) (0.0598) (0.0798) (0.0577) (0.0481) (0.1103) (0.0594) (0.0497)
* ***
Constant -0.0544 -0.0587 -0.0527 -0.0670 -0.0786 -0.0975 -0.0722 -0.0978
(0.0180) (0.0275) (0.0300) (0.0664) (0.0156) (0.0187) (0.0269) (0.1082)
*** ** * *** *** **
Relative time effects linear linear linear linear linear linear linear linear
Observations 62 62 76 46 58 58 72 46
R-squared 0.4157 0.3802 0.5026 0.5137 0.4579 0.4140 0.5432 0.5393
Fuzzy RDD Sharp RDD
Baseline Controls Bandwidth Falsification Baseline Controls Bandwidth Falsification
Non-affiliated firms -0.1787 -0.2446 -0.1706 -0.0370 -0.1222 -0.1309 -0.0986 -0.0337
 * treatment dummy (0.0653) (0.1118) (0.0650) (0.0607) (0.0428) (0.0306) (0.0309) (0.0928)
** ** ** *** *** ***
Affiliated firms 0.2565 0.1080 0.1798 -0.0295 -0.0512 -0.0636 -0.0681 -0.0216
* treatment dummy (0.0916) (0.1877) (0.0887) (0.0497) (0.0159) (0.0317) (0.0272) (0.0255)
*** * *** * **
Affiliated firms 0.0779 0.1072 0.0707 0.0380 -0.0080 0.0612 0.0540 0.0634
(0.0265) (0.0411) (0.0474) (0.1109) (0.0273) (0.0309) (0.0442) (0.0984)
*** ** *
Constant -0.0710 -0.0814 -0.0888 -0.1138 -0.0865 -0.1283 -0.1113 -0.1247
(0.0163) (0.0481) (0.0210) (0.0532) (0.0164) (0.0181) (0.0212) (0.0870)
*** *** ** *** *** ***
Relative time effects linear linear linear linear linear linear linear linear
Observations 62 62 76 46 58 58 72 46
R-squared 0.6650 0.5670 0.6919 0.5906 0.6990 0.5762 0.7091 0.5963
Fuzzy RDD Sharp RDD
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Panel C. Occupation-level analysis (Employment growth)2 
 
Regressions are weighted by the number of employees in 2010 and include controls for log average firm size 
and export intensity unless stated otherwise. *, **, *** refer to statistical significance levels of 10%, 5% and 
1% respectively. “Controls”: affiliation status only; “bandwidth”: October 2010-August 2011; 
“Falsification”: placebo reform date (mid-May 2011) using agreements in post-reform period only (March 
2011 – August 2011).   
1. Standard errors are robust and clustered by collective agreement and signature date.  
2. Standard errors are robust and clustered by collective agreement, occupation and signature date.  
Authors’ calculations based on QP and DGERT data.  
 
C.   The role of representativeness and retroactivity  
We now consider the role of representativeness and retro-activity for the impact of 
extensions on the employment performance of non-affiliated and affiliated firms. The 
degree of representativeness of employer associations is measured by the share of the 
workforce in affiliated firms in the total employment of the relevant sector. This definition 
is the same as the representativeness criterion that were introduced as part of the 2012 labor 
market reform.  
The results indicate that degree of representativeness does not appear to matter significantly 
for the impact of extensions for either affiliated or non-affiliated firms (Table 5a). In fact, 
almost all coefficients of the interactions between extension and representativeness are 
insignificant. Moreover, in additional robustness checks (available upon request), we find 
similar results when considering dummy variables defined at different representativeness 
thresholds (30% and 50%, for instance). 
This may be surprising given the systematic differences in the impact of extensions between 
affiliated and non-affiliated firms. The absence of an apparent role for representativeness 
here may be due to a number of factors. A technical explanation could be that it is not the 
Baseline Controls Bandwidth Falsification Baseline Controls Bandwidth Falsification
Nnon-affiliated firms -0.1736 -0.1388 -0.1716 -0.0339 -0.0470 -0.0524 -0.0379 -0.0007
 (0.0802) (0.0607) (0.0594) (0.0420) (0.0295) (0.0290) (0.0214) (0.0494)
** ** *** * *
Affiliated firms 0.1927 0.1232 0.0834 0.0096 -0.0934 -0.0966 -0.0904 -0.0595
(0.1271) (0.1010) (0.0848) (0.0431) (0.0522) (0.0583) (0.0360) (0.0489)
* * **
Constant 1.4994 -0.0597 -0.2883 -0.6165 1.4808 -0.0978 -0.3074 -0.6435
(1.8100) (0.0331) (0.3566) (0.0821) (1.8108) (0.0254) (0.3565) (0.0887)
* *** *** ***
Relative time effects linear linear linear linear linear linear linear linear
Observations 3,320 3,320 4,257 2,451 3,048 3,048 3,985 2,451
R-squared 0.0779 0.0235 0.1534 0.1636 0.0830 0.0256 0.1666 0.1652
Fuzzy RDD, Employment growth Sharp RDD, Employment growth
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variation in representativeness per se that matters but whether a majority of employees is 
represented or not. While we have looked at this as well, identification is not 
straightforward due to the very limited number of agreements with representativeness 
levels above 50%. A substantive explanation could be that representativeness criteria based 
on a majority rule – as was introduced during the 2012 reform – are not sufficient for 
ensuring that the interests of non-affiliated firms are fully taken into account.  This may be 
either because a 50% threshold is not high enough or because, in practice, bargaining is 
largely driven by market leaders in a sector with smaller affiliated firms in the same sector 
having little or no influence over the outcome of the negotiations. This suggests that 
representativeness criteria may need to be fine-tuned further or be complemented with a 
test of public interest as is the case in, for example, in the Netherlands.  
All in all, the results do not allow drawing strong conclusions about the effectiveness of 
representativeness criteria in mitigating the adverse impact of extensions. However, even 
if representativeness criteria do not effectively ensure that the interests of non-affiliated 
firms are taken into account, representativeness criteria may still play a useful role in the 
longer-term by promoting the degree of organization among employers, particularly if 
implemented gradually over time. This may be valuable per se as it is may help to improve 
the quality of industrial relations as well as the degree of trust between social partners (see 
also Box 3.2 in IMF, 2016).  
Our next topic concerns the requirement for non-affiliated firms to retro-actively pay wage 
increases over the period from the entry-into-force date of collective agreements among 
affiliated firms to the publication date of the extension to non-affiliated firms. The rationale 
of applying retro-activity to extensions is to ensure that a level playing field between 
signatory and non-signatory firms is preserved, consistent with the spirit of sector-level 
bargaining and the logic behind extensions (Hijzen et al., 2019). However, their potential 
bite is considerable, particularly for liquidity-constrained firms: in fact, the typical time for 
processing an extension in Portugal in the period from late 2010 to early 2011 was about 
180 days (about six months).    
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Table 5a. Results on the role of representativeness by affiliation status 
   
Regressions are weighted by the number of employees in 2010. Standard errors are robust and clustered by 
collective agreement and signature date. *, **, *** refer to statistical significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. “Representativeness” is measured by the share of the workforce in affiliated firms in the total 
employment of the relevant sector. 
 
We find that retro-activity plays a potentially important role in explaining the adverse 
impact of extensions on employment among non-affiliated firms (Table 5b). The degree of 
retro-activity is measured by the number of days between the entry-into-force date of the 
collective agreement among affiliated firms and the publication date of the extension to 
non-affiliated firms. The negative average treatment effect reflects the impact of extensions 
(1) (2) (1) (2)
∆E ∆∆E ∆E ∆∆E
Treatment effect * -0.1278 -0.1757 -0.0822 -0.0974
 non-affiliated firms (0.0424) (0.0621) (0.0354) (0.0386)
*** *** ** **
Treatment effect * 0.3415 0.3383 -0.0780 -0.0531
 affiliated firms (0.1412) (0.1542) (0.0427) (0.0454)
** ** *
Representativeness * -0.2729 -0.1284 -0.3197 -0.0297
 non-affiliated firms (0.1469) (0.1888) (0.1690) (0.1893)
* *
Representativeness * 0.1770 0.0388 0.0805 -0.0691
 affiliated firms (0.0797) (0.1047) (0.0594) (0.0769)
**
Treatment dummy * 0.3024 0.1296 0.2443 -0.1178
 non-affiliated firms * (0.1603) (0.2129) (0.1706) (0.2044)
 representativeness *
Treatment dummy * -0.5177 -0.2431 -0.1288 -0.0233
 affiliated firms * (0.2553) (0.2887) (0.1087) (0.0989)
 representativeness *
Affiliated firms -0.2098 -0.2005 0.0079 -0.0016
(0.0866) (0.0741) (0.0428) (0.0406)
** **
Constant -0.0025 -0.0467 -0.0265 -0.0740
(0.0390) (0.0341) (0.0332) (0.0304)
**
Relative time effects linear linear linear linear
Observations 62 62 58 58
R-squared 0.5042 0.6747 0.5587 0.7248
Fuzzy Sharp
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on the change in employment growth for the typical administrative delay (180 days). The 
interaction of the treatment effect with the administrative delay gives the impact of a one- 
day increase in the administrative delay on the change in the growth rate of employment 
following an extension. This is negative for non-affiliated firms, while it is insignificant or 
even positive for affiliated firms. The difference between affiliated and non-affiliated is 
consistent with our discussion above since retro-activity should hit non-affiliated firms 
directly, while it may indirectly benefit affiliated firms by reducing competition from non-
affiliated firms.  
 
One can obtain an indication of the impact of extensions in the absence of retro-activity by 
considering their effect when there is no administrative delay in processing extensions, i.e. 
when the administrative delay is zero.  This is done by re-estimating our model while 
defining the administrative delay in absolute value rather than as the difference from 180. 
Doing so implies that the treatment dummy now captures the impact of extensions in the 
absence of any administrative delay, rather than its impact for an average administrative 
delay shown in Table 5b (results not reported). Under this specification, the overall impact 
of extensions on employment growth is reduced, and so is the extent to which the effects 
are concentrated among non-affiliated firms. In the case of the fuzzy RDD, the results 
indicate that retro-activity accounts for a substantial part of the adverse impact of 
extensions, with the negative effect on employment growth in non-affiliated firms falling 
by approximately 40%, but their effects remain sizeable and concentrated among non-
affiliated firms. By contrast, the results based on the sharp RDD suggest that extensions 
have no effect on employment growth in either non-affiliated or affiliated firms in the 
absence of any administrative delay. All in all, the results suggest that retro-activity 
explains a significant part of the negative effect of extensions on employment growth 
among non-affiliated firms.17  
 
 
 
 
17 These results should be interpreted with some caution since the discussion relies heavily on the assumed 
linear relationship between the length of the administrative delay and the impact of extensions and 
employment growth.  
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Table 5b. Results on the role of retroactivity by affiliation status 
   
Regressions are weighted by the number of employees in 2010. Standard errors are robust and clustered by 
collective agreement. *, **, *** refer to statistical significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
“Administrative delay” is defined in terms of the number of days since the entry-into-force date of the 
collective agreement among affiliated firms and the publication date of the extension to non-affiliated firms.    
At least in part, these results are likely to reflect the specific context during which the 
reform took place. Since collective agreements are public documents and there was little 
uncertainty as to whether or not a collective agreement would eventually be extended, retro-
activity should not pose any problem as long as firms act rationally and there are no 
financial frictions.  However, in a context where economic conditions were deteriorating 
rapidly and many (non-affiliated) firms were liquidity-constrained, the requirement to 
retro-actively pay wage increases seems to have slowed the growth rate of employment 
considerably (i.e. it would have made employment growth even more negative in most 
cases). It is important to bear in mind that in periods of growth these effects would most 
likely be smaller. These findings are also consistent with the large job losses found in 
(1) (2) (1) (2)
∆E ∆∆E ∆E ∆∆E
Treatment effect * -0.1026 -0.1688 -0.0459 -0.1100
 non-affiliated firms (0.0406) (0.0510) (0.0300) (0.0344)
** *** ***
Treatment effect * 0.1708 0.2452 -0.0919 -0.0498
 affiliated firms (0.0692) (0.0817) (0.0237) (0.0200)
** *** *** **
Treatment effect * -0.0003 -0.0006 -0.0003 -0.0005
 non-affiliated firms * (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003)
  administrative delay ** *** *
Treatment effect * -0.0001 0.0003 -0.0001 0.0001
 affiliated firms * (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002)
 administrative delay
Affiliated firms -0.0926 -0.1715 0.0763 -0.0111
(0.0543) (0.0493) (0.0270) (0.0282)
* *** ***
Constant -0.0549 -0.0682 -0.0785 -0.0859
(0.0191) (0.0176) (0.0161) (0.0169)
*** *** *** ***
Relative time effects linear linear linear linear
Observations 62 62 58 58
R-squared 0.4425 0.7089 0.4730 0.7176
Fuzzy Sharp
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Martins (2019), also considering a period of economic downturn (including the great 
recession).  
 
VI.   RESULTS ON WAGE INEQUALITY 
Collective bargaining has been regarded as an important mechanism towards reducing 
wage inequality in a labor market (e.g. Blanchard et al, 2014). Moreover, this effect can be 
strengthened by extensions, as these can widen dramatically the coverage of binding 
minimum wages for different occupations and job levels in multiple industries in a given 
country. In this section, we examine empirically the effects of extensions on wages and 
wage inequality. 
 
In order to take account of the fact that wages are set separately for different job categories 
within agreements, we focus on changes in residual wages and wage inequality within job 
categories, agreements, membership status and years. In an effort to control for the 
confounding role of composition effects when examining the impact of extensions on 
residual wages over time, we restrict the focus to workers who are employed in both 2010 
and 2011. The analysis is conducted by examining the change between 2010 and 2011 in 
the 5th, 10th, 15th and 20th percentile of the residual wage distribution as well as the changes 
in each of these moments relative to the median. Apart from the new dependent variable, 
the econometric model is identical to that used for the analysis of employment growth in 
the previous section.  
 
The results, presented in Table 6, show that extensions have a tendency to increase wages 
(only) in the bottom of the distribution and therefore also to reduce inequality. More 
specifically, extensions tend to increase wage growth by about 5 percentage points for 
workers in the fifth percentile of the residual wage distribution (column 1 of Panel B) and 
tend to reduce the growth rate of the P50/P5 percentile ratio by a similar amount. Moreover, 
the effects of extensions on wages and inequality become smaller when moving up the 
residual wage distribution. Its effects on the wages of workers in the 20th percentile of the 
residual wage distribution are insignificant in all specifications.18 
 
18 We also find similar insignificant results for higher percentiles (available upon request). Martins (2019) 
when considering continuing workers also finds that wages increase following extensions. 
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All in all, these findings support a binding interpretation of the extension mechanism, in 
the sense that they in fact push upwards the wages of the bottom tail of the distribution, 
which is in the background of the entire paper. The findings also suggest the existence of a 
trade-off between the adverse effects on employment documented in the previous section 
and the beneficial effects on the wages of low-wage workers and inequality documented 
here.  
 
Table 6. Results on inequality 
 
Results based on residuals from individual-level log base wage regression on job category dummies, 
collapsed by firm type (affiliated vs non-affiliated), collective agreement and year. Δp5 denotes the change 
in the 5th percentile (of the cell’s log base wage residual) between 2011 and 2010, Δ(p50-p5) denotes the 
difference between the median and the 5th percentile in 2011, and similarly for the remaining dependent 
variables. 
 
VII.   CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In many countries, collective bargaining coverage is supported by administrative 
extensions that widen the reach of collective agreements beyond their signatory parties to 
all firms and workers in their reference sectors. Because of their potential roles in 
stimulating wage growth and reinforcing downward wage rigidity, extensions have become 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆p5 ∆(p50-p5) ∆p10 ∆(p50-p10) ∆p15 ∆(p50-p15) ∆p20 ∆(p50-p20)
Treatment effect 0.0805 -0.0865 0.0695 -0.0755 0.0710 -0.0770 0.0289 -0.0349
(0.0373) (0.0481) (0.0400) (0.0532) (0.0566) (0.0721) (0.0285) (0.0453)
** * *
Constant -0.0286 0.0501 -0.0082 0.0296 -0.0248 0.0463 -0.0109 0.0324
(0.0221) (0.0296) (0.0205) (0.0297) (0.0327) (0.0419) (0.0165) (0.0259)
Relative time effects Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear
Observations 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62
R-squared 0.0875 0.1217 0.2290 0.2353 0.1727 0.1858 0.0644 0.1265
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆p5 ∆(p50-p5) ∆p10 ∆(p50-p10) ∆p15 ∆(p50-p15) ∆p20 ∆(p50-p20)
Treatment effect 0.0493 -0.0476 0.0494 -0.0477 0.0519 -0.0502 0.0184 -0.0166
(0.0232) (0.0294) (0.0213) (0.0306) (0.0296) (0.0392) (0.0147) (0.0242)
** ** *
Constant -0.0310 0.0522 -0.0087 0.0300 -0.0266 0.0478 -0.0109 0.0321
(0.0213) (0.0282) (0.0185) (0.0275) (0.0298) (0.0389) (0.0155) (0.0247)
*
Relative time effects Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear
Observations 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58
R-squared 0.1019 0.1442 0.2675 0.2510 0.2170 0.2120 0.0756 0.1275
Panel A. Fuzzy RDD
Panel B. Sharp RDD
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the focus of an increasingly intense policy debate in recent years. However, given the lack 
of hard evidence on the effects of extensions, and of collective bargaining more generally, 
the debate has largely tended to be based on subjective priors rather than factual arguments.  
By exploiting a natural experiment on collective bargaining in Portugal, this paper seeks to 
contribute to the ongoing discussions by providing new insights on the causal impact of 
extensions.  
 
More specifically, this paper analyzed the causal impact of administrative extensions on 
employment growth using a natural experiment that resulted from the immediate 
suspension of extensions by the government that took office in Portugal in June 2011. Our 
analysis employs a regression discontinuity design that exploits the administrative delay in 
issuing extensions in combination with their suspension in June 2011 and novel matched 
employer-employee-agreement panel data. Importantly, this suspension resulted in a sharp 
and unanticipated decline in the probability that an extension was issued, several months 
prior to the change in government.  
 
The results in the paper provide important insights for the debate on the role of extensions 
in countries undergoing adjustment periods – or, more generally, across countries facing 
the labour market effects of the Covid19 pandemic –, but also on collective bargaining 
more generally: 
 
First, our evidence indicates that extensions played an adverse role for employment 
growth during the period covered and, thereby, are likely to have amplified the 
unemployment response to the global financial crisis until they were suspended. 
However, we caution that the estimated adverse impact on employment growth may 
not necessarily generalize to periods with different economic conditions—in 
particular in periods of growth, as opposed to the recession period covered here—
or countries with different institutional settings (including with respect to retro-
activity and representativeness of unions and employer associations).   
Second, the adverse effects of extensions on employment growth mainly concern 
firms that are not affiliated with an employer association, i.e. those that do not 
participate or are not represented in the bargaining of collective agreements. The 
concentration of adverse employment effects among non-affiliated firms suggests 
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that extensions suit the interests of affiliated firms better than those of unaffiliated 
firms. This may imply that the lack of representativeness of employer associations 
is a potentially important factor behind the adverse effect of extensions. 
Third, however, the degree of representativeness of employer associations is not 
found to matter significantly for employment growth. This may reflect the low 
levels of, and limited variation in, representativeness in our data, or that 
representativeness criteria (such as those implemented in Portugal in 2012) are not 
sufficient to ensure effectively that agreements are in the public interest. However, 
even if the introduction of the strict representativeness criteria in 2012 did not have 
a direct impact on employment growth, they are likely to have had a major impact 
on wage adjustment by greatly reducing the number of extensions issued, and 
therefore, indirectly, contributed positively to employment growth. Over the longer 
term, they also may help to promote employer organization, particularly when 
representativeness criteria are introduced gradually, and contribute to the quality of 
industrial relations as well as trust between social partners 
Fourth, the retro-activity with which extensions entered into force until the 2012 
reform appears to be harmful for employment among non-affiliated firms. This has 
two important implications. It suggests that our results are to some extent specific 
to the weak economic conditions under which the “natural” experiment took place. 
If there were no uncertainty about the extension of agreements and firms were not 
liquidity-constrained, then retro-activity would not be expected to slow down 
employment growth. It also suggests that the 2012 reform may have helped to 
reduce the adverse effect of extensions by removing their retro-activity. Concerns 
that this undermines the spirit of sectoral bargaining and extensions can partly be 
addressed by shortening the administrative delay associated with issuing 
extensions. 
Fifth, there appears to be a trade-off between the adverse effects of extensions on 
employment growth and their beneficial effects on low wages and in promoting 
lower wage inequality.  
All in all, this paper considers many key features of sectoral bargaining, most of which for 
the very first time, using a novel type of matched data, and does so in a causal framework. 
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Hopefully further research for other countries and time periods will complement our 
findings and also contribute towards the establishment of a sounder international evidence 
base of the effects of collective bargaining. 
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Appendix 
 
Additional background information 
 
Agreements and extensions timeline: The timeline of an agreement is as follows: 1. signed 
by the two parties (employers’ and workers’ representatives); 2. submitted to the Ministry 
of Labour; 3. published by the Ministry of Labour (after a brief analysis by Ministry 
officials); 4. comes into force (at the same time as publication in step 3, although it may 
produce effects at that time, earlier or later, depending on what it is stated in the agreement 
itself). 
 
The timeline of an extension is as follows: 1. One or both subscribers request the extension 
of the agreement (once it is signed and submitted to the Ministry); 2. The Ministry conducts 
an analysis of the likely impact of the extension (based on the number of workers that would 
be subject to the extension, using the same QP data); 3. The Labour Minister publishes the 
extension, establishing its production of effects (typically backdated to the production of 
effects of the underpinning agreement). 
 
The interruption that is exploited in this paper concerns agreements that were published 
and in force and which had an extension pending (timeline point 2, when the analysis is 
being conducted) but which were not extended. 
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Table A1.  Collective agreements and extensions  
 
Agreement sector Date agreement Date extension
Metallurgic industry 08-09-2010 22-12-2010
Agriculture, fishing and forestry 22-09-2010 10-01-2011
Car sale 08-10-2010 10-01-2011
Viana do Castelo retail 08-10-2010 29-12-2010
Clinical analysis labs 08-11-2010 28-02-2011
Wine trade sector 22-11-2010 28-02-2011
Football clubs (players) 15-12-2010 22-03-2011
Cork industry, North, Office workers 29-12-2010 26-04-2011
Wine industry, cellars 10-01-2011 26-04-2011
Textile industry 24-01-2011
Hotels and restaurants, Centre and South 24-01-2011 23-05-2011
Aveiro retail 22-02-2011 23-05-2011
Ropes industry 28-02-2011
Chemical and pharmaceutical retail 28-02-2011 30-05-2011
Wood 09-03-2011
Pharmaceutical products retail 29-03-2011
Merchandising firms 29-03-2011
Viseu retail 08-04-2011
Wheat 08-04-2011
Coffee 08-04-2011
Driving schools 08-04-2011
Fish preserve industry 26-04-2011
Bread manufacturing, Lisbon 26-04-2011
Guarda, retail 29-04-2011
Poultry, slaughter 09-05-2011
Farming 09-05-2011
Meat, retail, South 16-05-2011
Retail storehouses 23-05-2011
Bread manufacturing 23-05-2011
Fishing 30-05-2011
Non-alcoholic beverages 30-05-2011
Cement 08-06-2011
Shoe manufacturing 15-07-2011
Farming, Abrantes 15-07-2011
Farming, Beja 22-07-2011
Construction sector 08-08-2011
Private schools 16-08-2011
Clothing 16-08-2011
Textile industry 16-08-2011
